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MODERN TRANSPORTATION NEEDS AND THE
PROHIBITIONS OF ARTICLE X, SECTION 10 OF THE
VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION
The Honorable Stephen R. McCullough *
INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Constitution plays the starring role
in contemporary jurisprudence and in legal education, on occa-
sion, Virginians are reminded of the importance of Virginia's own
state constitution. As the foundational charter of Virginia's gov-
ernment, the Virginia Constitution contains some distinctive
clauses shaped by Virginia's history. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, for the first time in almost thirty years, addressed the
scope of the "internal improvements clause"1 and the "credit
clause"2 in Montgomery County v. Virginia Department of Rail
and Public Transportation.' Specifically, the court was asked
whether these clauses prohibited the Commonwealth from enter-
ing into an agreement with Norfolk Southern to construct an "in-
termodal" rail4 facility in Montgomery County.5
This essay outlines the history of these two clauses and the lit-
igation between the county and the Commonwealth, and exam-
* Judge, Court of Appeals of Virginia. J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of
Law; B.A., 1994, University of Virginia. Prior to the author's appointment to the Court of
Appeals of Virginia, he served as State Solicitor General and Senior Appellate Counsel,
Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. The views expressed in this
article represent strictly the personal views of the author.
1. VA. CONST. art. X, § 10.
2. Id.
3. 282 Va. 422, 435-42, 719 S.E.2d 294, 300-04 (2011).
4. Intermodal rail is "a cooperative service where trucks pick up and deliver their
shipments, but the truck trailer (or container) is carried between cities by rail, thus reduc-
ing the number of trucks that have to travel by highway." REEBIE ASSOCIATES, THE
NORTHEAST-SOUTHEAST-MIDWEST CORRIDOR MARKETING STUDY EXAMINING THE
POTENTIAL TO DIVERT HIGHWAY TRAFFIC FROM INTERSTATE 81 TO RAIL INTERMODAL
MOVEMENT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (Dec. 15, 2003) (hereinafter MARKETING STUDY), http:
//www. drpt.virginia.gov/activitiesfilesI-81- Executive-Summary-revised.pdf.
5. Montgomery Cnty., 282 Va. at 434, 719 S.E.2d at 299.
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ines the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The essay con-
cludes by examining whether these clauses retain any contempo-
rary relevance.
1. HISTORICAL BACKDROP TO THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS
AND CREDIT CLAUSES
A. Financial Catastrophe Leads to Constitutional Restrictions
The term "internal improvements" has fallen into disuse. To
the founding generation, however, internal improvements consti-
tuted an object of great interest. Essentially, internal improve-
ments are transportation infrastructure. One of the overriding
policy objectives for the newly independent United States was to
open the West for settlement and to develop rich resources of the
interior. Both objectives required internal improvements, at that
time chiefly roads and canals.7
To meet this need, the General Assembly in 1816 established a
Board of Public Works.8 This board was tasked with investing
state funds in the stock of canal, turnpike and other "public work"
companies.9 The General Assembly sought by these expenditures
to "render[] navigable, and unit[e] by canals, the principal rivers,
and... more intimately connect[], by public highways, the differ-
ent parts of this Commonwealth."'0
Consistent with this mandate, the Board of Public Works in
1816 proceeded to purchase stock in the Appomattox Canal Com-
pany, the Dismal Swamp Canal Company, the James River Canal
Company, and the Little River Turnpike Company, among oth-
ers.1' The underpinning for this investment was the notion that
6. Senator Bradley T. Johnson described internal improvements as "railroads, ca-
nals, plank roads, turnpikes and road and river improvements." REPORT OF THE S. COMM.
ON FINANCE RELATIVE TO THE PUBLIC DEBT, S. DOc. No. 24, at 8 (1877) (hereinafter
JOHNSON REPORT). Although the Supreme Court of Virginia has never defined the term, it
has stated that internal improvements include "turnpikes, canals, railroads, telegraph
lines.., telephone lines, and other works of a like quasi public character." Shenandoah
Lime Co. v. Mann, 115 Va. 865, 872, 80 S.E. 753, 755 (1914).
7. See Act of Feb. 5, 1816, ch. 17, 1816 Va. Acts 35.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 37-38.
10. Id. at 35.
11. See 2 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTIUN OF VIRGINIA 1102
n.16 (1974); Phillip Morrison Rice, The Virginia Board of Public Works Appendix G (1947)
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the government's role was "to provide incentive for private ac-
tion.1 2
With the advent of railroads, the state overwhelmingly shifted
its investments to rail.3 Initially, these investments consisted
principally of purchases of stock funded from tax revenues. 4 After
1831, however, the Commonwealth primarily turned to loans to
finance stock purchases.'5 The trend of borrowing gained momen-
tum when additional borrowing became necessary to protect ex-
isting investments.'6
The first sign of trouble came during the financial panic of
1837. Some states repudiated their debts outright.' Virginia did
not do so, but experienced great difficulty in meeting its obliga-
tions.'8 These warnings, combined with the general sense that the
General Assembly was guilty of "extravagance in the expenditure
of funds for internal improvements," led to calls for a constitu-
tional amendment.'9 As the Supreme Court of Virginia later re-
counted,
[L]arge sums of money were loaned or advanced by Virginia to vari-
ous corporations engaged in developing and operating privately
owned works of internal improvements, such as canal, turnpike, and
railroad companies, that held promise of public benefit. Financial ob-
ligations in vast sums were incurred by the State, and its credit was
freely but often unwisely extended to foster these enterprises by pur-
chase of their bonds and stock, or through guarantee of their obliga-
tions and indebtedness.2
0
In response, the Constitution of 1850-51 imposed the first re-
strictions on the power of the General Assembly to expend funds
and contract debt for internal improvements, prohibiting the
(unpublished M.A. dissertation) (on file with the Library of Virgima).
12. HOWARD, supra note 11, at 1102.
13. See JOHNSON REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
14. Philip Morrison Rice, Internal Improvements in Virginia 1775-1860, at 162-63
(1948) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) (on file
with the Library of Virginia).
15. See id. at 187.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 203. See generally WILLIAM A. Scorr, THE REPUDIATION OF STATE DEBTS
(1893) (studying debt repudiation and the financial history of several states).
18. Rice, supra note 14, at 194-204.
19. Francis Pendleton Gaines, Jr., The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1850-
51: A Study in Sectionalism 261 (June, 1950) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Virginia) (on file with the Library of Virginia).
20. Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 787-88, 91 S.E.2d 660, 665 (1956).
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General Assembly from "pledg[ing] the faith of the State, or
bind[ing] it any form, for the debts or obligations of any company
or corporation."21 This prohibition was expanded in the Constitu-
tion of 1864 which specified that
[n]o debt shall be contracted by this State except to meet casual defi-
cits in the revenue, to redeem a previous liability of the State, or to
suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or defend the State in time of
war. If the State becomes a stockholder in any association or corpo-
ration for purposes of internal improvements, such stock shall be
paid for at the time of subscription, or a tax shall be levied for the
ensuing year sufficient to pay the subscription in full. 22
The constitutional amendments, however, did not abolish exist-
ing commitments. By 1870, Virginia's total debt stood at $45 mil-
lion." The annual interest charge on this debt stood at $2 mil-
lion-this at a time when the Commonwealth's entire revenue for
1869 did not reach $3 million.4 When this massive debt was com-
bined with the great losses suffered during the Civil War, Virgin-
ia simply could not pay these obligations. Moreover, the optimis-
tic assumptions concerning the profitability of the railroads
turned out to be unfounded. "[W]ith only one single exception,
every railroad company.., proved unprofitable to its projectors
1125and owners ....
The remaining debt obligations generated a protracted battle
in the courts and in the legislature. Debt "readjusters" gained
control of the General Assembly and sought through various
stratagems to devalue or repudiate Virginia's debt.26 The fact that
the debt had to be apportioned between Virginia and West Virgin-
ia only added complexity to an already difficult issue. 7
The Supreme Court of Virginia is well aware of the historical
backdrop that gave rise to these clauses. It has noted that
21. VA. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 28.
22. VA. CONST. of 1864, art. IV, § 29.
23. See SCOn, supra note 17, at 215-16.
24. Id.
25. JOHNSON REPORT, supra note 6.
26. See SCOn, supra note 17, at 167-96. See also McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S.
102, 106 (1898) (citations omitted) ("Perhaps no litigation has been more severely contest-
ed or has presented more intricate and troublesome questions than that which has arisen
under the [readjuster] coupon legislation of Virginia. That legislation has been prolific of
many cases, both in the state and Federal courts, not a few of which finally came to this
court.").
27. SCOTT, supra note 17, at 167.
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[t]he provision forbidding the State to "become a party to or become
interested in any work of internal improvement," as well as the
"credit" and the "stock or obligations" clauses was inserted in the
basic law to remedy the same evil, and the three clauses were adopt-
ed to meet the same long existing threat and danger, namely, the
use of the State's funds and credit to foster and encourage construc-
28tion and operation of private enterprises.
Significantly, the internal improvements clause was amended
in 1902.29 The amendment exempted public roads from the scope
of the prohibition on acquiring an interest in works of internal
improvement.0 Professor Howard observes that "[m]uch of the
heart was cut out of this clause in 1902" with the ratification of
the "public roads" exception.'
B. The Clauses in the Courts
Over the years, the Supreme Court of Virginia has addressed
numerous legal challenges invoking the internal improvements
clause and credit clause. With one lone exception, none of these
challenges has been met with success.
The court has rejected credit clause attacks on the purchase of
securities when the purchase was made for the Commonwealth's
benefit, namely, the Virginia Supplemental Retirement System;
to approve the lease of public port facilities by a private compa-
ny; 3 to sustain the issuance of bonds by a public school authori-
ty;84 and to uphold loan and bond commitments designed to rede-
velop a blighted neighborhood. 6 In each case, the "moving
consideration and motivating cause of a transaction" were the
keys to the outcome. 6 In City of Charlottesville v. DeHaan, the
court held that
[w]hen the underlying and activating purpose of the transaction and
the financial obligation incurred are for the State's benefit, there is
28. Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 793, 91 S.E.2d 660, 668 (1956).
29. VA. CONST. of 1902, art. XIII, § 185.
30. Id.
31. HOWARD, supra note 11, at 1133.
32. Almond, 197 Va. at 791, 91 S.E.2d at 667.
33. Harrison v. Day, 202 Va. 967, 971-72, 121 S.E.2d 615, 618 (1961).
34. Button v. Day, 203 Va. 687, 693, 127 S.E.2d 122, 127 (1962).
35. City of Charlottesville v. DeHaan, 228 Va. 578, 592, 323 S.E.2d 131, 138 (1984).
36. Id. at 585-86, 323 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Almond, 197 Va. at 790-91, 91 S.E.2d at
666-67).
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no lending of its credit though it may have expended its funds or in-
curred an obligation that benefits another. Merely because the State
incurs an indebtedness or expends its funds for its benefit and others
may incidentally profit thereby does not bring the transaction within
the letter or the spirit of the "credit clause "prohibition.37
Despite extensive challenges invoking the clause, the Supreme
Court of Virginia has invalidated only one legislative enactment
as a violation of the credit clause. In Button v. Day, the court held
that a fund designed to guarantee loans for industrial projects
was invalid under the credit clause because it was designed "for
the sole purpose of guaranteeing future payment of defaulted
loans of private debtors."38 The Virginia Constitution was then
promptly amended to allow such extensions of credit."
Litigants seeking to bar governmental action based on the in-
ternal improvements clause have fared even worse than litigants
pressing claims under the credit clause. For example, in Harrison
u. Day, the court held that the internal improvements clause did
not prohibit the Commonwealth from owning and operating port
facilities.0 The court reasoned that the internal improvements
clause was not designed to hamper the Commonwealth in the ex-
ercise of its governmental functions, and the development and
operation of port facilities is a governmental function.4' Building
on this premise, the court later held that the leasing of govern-
ment-owned port facilities to a private entity did not offend the
internal improvements clause.2
The court has broadly construed the public roads exception to
the internal improvements clause. In Almond v. Gilmer, the court
held that a public ferry was not forbidden by the internal im-
provements clause, reasoning that a ferry serves the same pur-
pose as a public road and, like a bridge, serves to connect two
roads.43 Later, in Almond v. Day, the court held that the internal
improvements clause did not prohibit the Commonwealth from
37. Id. at 586, 323 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Almond, 197 Va. at 791, 91 S.E.2d at 667).
38. 208 Va. 494, 504, 158 S.E.2d 735, 741-42 (1968).
39. VA. CONST. art. X, § 10. The amendment provides that article X, section 10 "shall
not be construed to prohibit the General Assembly from establishing an authority with
power to insure and guarantee loans to finance industrial development and industrial ex-
pansion and from making appropriations to such authority." Id.
40. 200 Va. 764, 775, 107 S.E.2d 594, 601 (1959).
41. Id. at 772-75, 107 S.E.2d at 599-601.
42. Harrison v. Day, 202 Va. 967, 972, 121 S.E.2d 615, 618 (1961).
43. 188 Va. 822, 837-38, 51 S.E.2d 272, 277-78 (1949).
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acquiring bus facilities designed to help transport pedestrians
through the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel." The court reasoned
that
[b]y constructing the bridge-tunnel project and furnishing the pro-
posed bus operation, the State is merely substituting one essential
link in the highway for an existing link. Without the operation of the
ferryboat for the transportation of passengers and vehicles across
the water, the highway would end at the water's edge. Without the
operation of an adequate facility for the transportation of pedestri-
ans over the bridge-tunnel pro ect, the highway would end for them
at the terminals of the project.
In short, if history is any guide, litigants relying on these
clauses to invalidate actions by the General Assembly or the ex-
ecutive branch face long odds.
II. NORFOLK SOUTHERN AND THE COMMONWEALTH REACH AN
AGREEMENT TO BUILD AN INTERMODAL RAIL FACILITY
A. The Virtues of Intermodal Rail
Many of Virginia's roads, including Interstate 81, have become
very congested. Interstate 81 was designed "to carry no more than
15 percent of its total traffic volume as truck traffic."4 At present,
trucks comprise as much as forty percent of the traffic volume.47
One solution is to build more roads. That approach is extremely
expensive. More than ten years ago, the General Assembly noted
that widening Interstate 81 "is estimated to cost in excess of $3
billion and take at least 10 years to complete."4
In 1999, the General Assembly became interested in the poten-
tial for a "network of intermodal transfer facilities" to "reduc[e]
heavy truck traffic on other long-haul highways in the Common-
wealth, particularly Interstate Route 81," and it tasked the Secre-
tary of Transportation to study "the desirability and feasibility of
44. 199 Va. 1, 10, 97 S.E.2d 824, 831 (1957).
45. Id. at 9, 97 SE.2d at 830-31.
46. S.J. Res. 55, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
47. Id.
48. Id.
20121
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establishing additional intermodal transfer facilities. 49 In 2000,
the Senate made a similar request.0
In January 2001, the Secretary issued a report calling for addi-
tional study of the issue but noted that "the potential for signifi-
cant public benefits exists" for "divert[ing] highway traffic to rail
transportation."'" Another study prepared for the Virginia De-
partment of Rail and Public Transportation ("DRPT"') in Decem-
ber 2003 concluded that "public investment in rail intermodal in-
frastructure can produce material relief for highway traffic ... in
a practical time frame."5 State officials counted on intermodal
rail to provide relief of highway congestion, increased safety, im-
proved fuel efficiency, reduced emissions, and enhanced industry
competitiveness.5'
Still another study, known as VTrans 2025 and prepared by
the Commonwealth Transportation Board, was released in No-
vember 2004 and noted the "great potential for both economic
growth and improved transportation system efficiency through
improved connectivity between transportation networks and
modes.54 Around the same time, a commission convened by Gov-
ernor Mark Warner issued its report on Rail Enhancement for the
21st Century.5 It too highlighted the need to increase freight rail
capacity, and in particular urged creation of "rail intermodal ter-
minal facilities," including one in the Roanoke area.56
The General Assembly responded by authorizing the Com-
monwealth Transportation Board to spend funds for "rail projects
49. H.J. Res. 704, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
50. S.J. Res. 55, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000) (requesting further study "on
the desirability and feasibility of establishing additional int6rmodal transfer facilities...
to include the potential for shifting Virginia's highway traffic to railroads").
51. REPORT OF THE SEC'Y OF TRANSP. ON THE POTENTIAL FOR SHIFTING VIRGINIA'S
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC TO R.RS., S. Doc. No. 30, at 30 (2001).
52. MARKETING STUDY, supra note 4, at 7-8.
53. See Cambridge Systematics, Inc. & Jacobs Civil, Inc., THE VIRGINIA STATE RAIL
PLAN: A MULTIMODAL STRATEGY TO MEET THE COMMONWEALTH'S PASSENGER AND
FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION NEEDS THROUGH 2025, at SR-2 (2004), http://www.drpt.virgin
ia.gov/activities/files/FR5-DRPT-VSRP-Summary-Report.pdf.
54. COMMONWEALTH TRANSP. BD., VIRGINIA'S STATEWIDE MULTIMODAL LONG-RANGE
TRANSPORTATION PLAN 65 (2004), http://www.virginiadot.org/projects/vtrans/resources/
revisedphase3reportforctb.pdf.
55. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON RAIL ENHANCEMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY IN THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.drpt.virginia.gov/activities/files/
RailCommissionReport2004.pdf.
56. Id. at 32-33
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that, in the Board's determination, will result in mitigation of
highway congestion."57 The General Assembly also empowered
DRPT to "[p]romote the use of... freight rail services to improve
the mobility of Virginia's citizens and the transportation of
goods."58 Similarly, the General Assembly has required the
Statewide Transportation Plan to evaluate "all modes of trans-
portation," including "movement of freight by rail" and "inter-
modal connectivity.""
The Heartland Corridor Project enhances the appeal of inter-
modal rail. This project calls for a series of rail infrastructure pro-
jects that will enable containers to travel from the Port of Norfolk
to Chicago on double-stacked rail cars." Once completed, the
travel time and travel distance for double-stacked rail cars will be
reduced.6' Virginia has signed an agreement with three other
states to enable this, project to go forward."
To pursue the benefits of intermodal rail, the General Assem-
bly established the Rail Enhancement Fund (the "Fund"). In
part A of the statute, the General Assembly
declares it to be in the public interest that railway preservation and
development of railway transportation facilities are an important el-
ement of a balanced transportation system of the Commonwealth for
freight and passengers and further declares it to be in the public in-
terest that the retention, maintenance, improvement and develop-
ment of freight and passenger railways are essential to the Com-
monwealth's continued economic growth, vitality, and competitive-
ness in national and world markets, and there is hereby created in
the state treasury a special nonreverting fund to be known as the
Rail Enhancement Fund which shall be considered a special fund
within the Transportation Trust Fund .... ,64
The Fund is to be administered by the director of the DRPT,
subject to the approval of the Commonwealth Transportation
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-23.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
58. Id. § 33.1-391.5(10) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
59. Id. § 33.1-23.03 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
60. H.J. Res. 789, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2005).
61. See id.
62. See id.; Press Release, Norfolk S., Agreement Reached on Fed. Funding for Heart-
land Corridor (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.nscorp.com/nscportal/nscorp[Media/
News% 20Releases/2006/heartland-fund.html.
63. VA. CODEANN. § 33.1-221.1:1.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
64. Id.
2012]
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Board." The statute further provides that "[p]rojects undertaken
pursuant to this section shall be limited to those the Common-
wealth Transportation Board shall have determined will result in
public benefits to the Commonwealth or to a region of the Com-
monwealth that are equal to or greater than the investment of
funds under this section."" The General Assembly also estab-
lished a Rail Advisory Board to advise the director of DRPT.67 The
Commonwealth Transportation Board, in conjunction with Rail
Advisory Board, developed policies to guide the expenditure of
funds.68
In October of 2005, Norfolk Southern submitted an application
to DRPT under the Fund.69 The application requested funding for
several projects in connection with the Heartland Corridor, in-
cluding enlarging tunnel clearances at several locations (none of
them in Montgomery County), as well as a new intermodal ter-
minal to be located somewhere in the Roanoke region°.7 Norfolk
Southern explained that without public assistance the project
would not happen. This facility was to "serve both the east-west
traffic flows of the Heartland Corridor as well as future north-
south flows... associated with the 1-81 corridor.
7 2
On December 15, 2005, the Commonwealth Transportation
Board, based on a recommendation by DRPT, voted unanimously
to provide funding under the Fund for a number of infrastructure
projects, including an intermodal facility in the Roanoke region.73
The board concluded that "these projects will result in public ben-
efits to the Commonwealth as well as the various regions of the
Commonwealth in which these projects are located, and serves
[sic] the public purpose. 74
65. Id. § 33.1-221.1:1.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
66. Id. § 33.1-221.1:1.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
67. Id. § 33.1-221.1:1.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009). This section was amended and no longer
refers to the Rail Advisory Board. Id. (Repl. Vol. 2011).
68. See COMMONWEALTH TRANSP. BD., RAIL ENHANCEMENT FUND POLICY GOALS AND
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES FY2005-06 at 3-10 (Oct. 20, 2005).
69. Montgomery Cnty. v. Va. Dep't of Rail & Pub. Transp., 282 Va. 422, 432, 719
S.E.2d 294, 298 (2011).
70. See id.
71. Id. at 432-33, 719 S.E.2d at 298.
72. Id. at 432, 719 S.E.2d at 298.
73. Id. at 433, 719 S.E.2d at 298.
74. Id., 719 S.E.2d at 298-99.
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DRPT and Norfolk Southern executed an agreement in which
Virginia contributed $22,350,000 to the project." A subsequent
amendment provided an additional $4,410,000 in state funding."
In exchange, Norfolk Southern agreed to build and operate the
facility.77
The agreement provided that DRPT "has an interest in ensur-
ing that [the] improvements created by the [p]roject continue to
be operated for their intended purpose for the duration of the
[p]erformance [pleriod," which is fifteen years from the date of
project completion.8 The agreement required Norfolk Southern to
transport at least 150,000 additional containers per year through
the Heartland Corridor within five years of the project's comple-
tion.7" If Norfolk Southern did not reach this target, the agree-
ment called for DRPT to be reimbursed based on a formula speci-
fied in the contract.0 Finally, if Norfolk Southern abandoned or
ceased to operate the intermodal facility, DRPT "shall be reim-
bursed the value of its interest in the portion of the [p]roject
abandoned or discontinued."1 Ultimately, a site in Montgomery
County was chosen to build the intermodal rail facility. 2
Initially, local governments, including Montgomery County,
embraced the project.3 Upon learning that the intermodal facility
would be located in the county, however, the county changed its
mind, concluding that it did not want the project because of the
incompatibility of the project with the county's plans for the El-
liston area where the facility was to be built. 4
75. Id., 719 S.E.2d at 299.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81, id. (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id. at 433 n.3, 719 S.E.2d at 299 n.3.
83. Montgomery County Selected for $18 Million Regional Intermodal Rail Facility
(June 28, 2006), http:(/nrvalliance.org/news/documentslnorfolksouthernannouncement.
pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (quoting Steve Spradlin, chairman of the Montgomery
County Board of Supervisors, as saying that "the County is extremely pleased to have
been contacted by Norfolk Southern in its search for the preferred Site and is anxious to
work with Norfolk Southern as they finalize their Site selection in Montgomery County for
this project").
84. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Res. in Opposition of the Proposed Norfolk
S. Intermodal Rail Facility in the Elliston Cmty. of Montgomery Cnty., Va., R-FY-007-50
(Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.montva.com/filestorage/1144/i00/326/328/336/938/2006-09-25
2012]
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III. MONTGOMERY COUNTY'S CHALLENGE UNDER THE INTERNAL
IMPROVEMENTS AND CREDIT CLAUSES
The county filed suit in the Richmond City Circuit Court.85 Nor-
folk Southern intervened in support of the project.6 With respect
to the credit clause, the county argued that "credit" represents a
broader concept under the Virginia Constitution than simply ex-
tending a loan to a particular entity.87 The county contended that
the agreement at issue was analogous to the guarantee fund in-
validated in Button v. Day.8 In response, the Commonwealth and
Norfolk Southern argued that a grant, conditioned upon Norfolk
Southern meeting certain benchmarks, did not resemble a loan
and, therefore, did not fall within the credit clause prohibition.8
The county further argued that a large rail facility such as this
one plainly constituted an "internal improvement"-a point the
Commonwealth and Norfolk Southern did not contest.96 Further,
the county contended that, under the contract, the Common-
wealth expressly has an "interest" in this facility, thereby violat-
ing the prohibition on the state acquiring an interest in a work of
internal improvement.91 Finally, the county asserted that the pub-
lic roads exception did not permit Virginia to acquire such an in-
terest in a railroad facility because a privately owned railroad
plainly is not a "public road" such as a highway.92 The Common-
wealth and Norfolk Southern countered that, under the court's
precedent, the public roads exception had been broadly construed
to afford the Commonwealth flexibility in addressing its transpor-
tation needs.93 Moreover, the "interest" acquired by the state in
_m.pdf; Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Res. Requesting the Governor and the Va.
Gen. Assembly to Oppose the Commonwealth of Va. Providing State Funding to Norfolk S.
for the Development of an Intermodal Facility in the Elliston Cmty. of Montgomery Cnty.,
Va., R-FY-07-62 (Oct. 23, 2006), http://www.montva.com/filestorage/1144/100/326/328/336/
938/2006-10-23m.pdf.
85. Montgomery Cnty. v. Va. Dep't of Rail & Pub. Transp., 79 Va. Cir. 521 (2009)
(Richmond City), offd, 282 Va. 422, 442, 719 S.E.2d 294, 304 (2011).
86. See id. at 522.
87. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 29-32, Montgomery Cnty., 79 Va. Cir.
521 (No. CL08-4290-1).
88. Id. (citing Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 501-02, 158 S.E.2d 735, 739-40 (1968)).
89. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.'s Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 35-
36, Montgomery Cnty., 79 Va. Cir. 521 (No. CL08-4209-1).
90. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 87, at 13.
91. Id. at 14, 17-20.
92. Id. at 27.
93. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.'s Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
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the contract was not the sort of capitalization of private enter-
prise that lay at the root of the constitutional prohibition.94 In-
stead, the Commonwealth's interest in the intermodal facility was
a contractual arrangement: Norfolk Southern agrees to transport
a fixed number of "containers" within a specified time frame, in
exchange for which the Commonwealth provides a grant.95 Such
contractual agreements, the Commonwealth argued, do not vio-
late the internal improvements clause.
The Richmond City Circuit Court, on cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, granted the Commonwealth's motion for sum-
mary judgment. The county appealed to the Supreme Court of
Virginia and its petition for appeal was granted.99
A. The Supreme Court of Virginia Upholds the Project
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in a unanimous opinion au-
thored by Justice Elizabeth McClanahan, affirmed the decision of
the circuit court.99
Turning first to the internal improvements clause, the court
observed that the public roads exception to article X, section 10
was amended to allow the General Assembly to construct, oper-
ate, and maintain a highway system.00 The county's challenge
"must be rejected if the development can be reasonably deemed
an exercise of the Commonwealth's governmental function of con-
structing, maintaining and operating its highway system."'' Con-
sulting the General Assembly's resolutions with regard to inter-
modal rail, the court concluded that the intermodal facility here
would be developed and integrated with Virginia's highway sys-
tem as a "roadway connector" which would permit "the seamless
note 89, at 24-25.
94. See id. at 31.
95. Id. at 33-34.
96. Id. at 24-25.
97. Montgomery Cnty. v. Va. Dep't of Rail & Pub. Transp., 79 Va. Cir. 521, 523 (2009)
(Richmond City), affd, 282 Va. 422, 442, 719 S.E.2d 294, 304 (2011).
98. Montgomery Cnty. v. Va. Dep't of Rail & Pub. Transp., 282 Va. 422, 428, 719
S.E.2d 294, 295-96 (2011).
99. Id. at 427-28, 719 S.E.2d at 295-96. It is noteworthy that the attorney general
personally argued the case on behalf of the state defendants. Id. at 426, 719 S.E.2d at 295.
100. Id. at 437, 719 S.E.2d at 301 (quoting Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822, 837, 51
S.E.2d 272, 277 (1949)).
101. Id.
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transfer of rail-to-truck and the reverse."'0 2 Intermodal rail, in the
judgment of the General Assembly, would provide a means "of re-
lieving Virginia's highways of congestion from excessive truck
traffic, and particularly Interstate 81."1°" The court, therefore,
concluded that "the funding for the facility under the Agreement"
did not infringe upon the internal improvements clause because it
was "directly related to the construction, maintenance and opera-
tion of Virginia's highways."'04 Finally, the court rejected the
county's argument that private ownership of the facility altered
the applicability of the public roads exception.
10 5
The court made short work of the county's credit clause argu-
ment. The court observed that "in the absence of an extension of
actual credit by the Commonwealth, the credit clause does not
apply."'0 6 Credit under the credit clause, the court explained, is
the "customary relation of borrower and lender" where "money is
borrowed for a fixed time, and the borrower promises to repay the
amount borrowed at a stated time in the future, with interest at a
fixed rate."'0 7 The Commonwealth's "grant to Norfolk Southern for
the development of the intermodal facility was only that, a grant,
and not an extension of the Commonwealth's credit to Norfolk
Southern. Indeed, it was effectively a purchase by the Common-
wealth of additional traffic capacity for Interstate 81."1" The state
did not extend any credit to Norfolk Southern.
The court's conclusion with respect to the internal improve-
ments clause is consistent with prior cases, in which the court
broadly construed the public roads exception. 10 9 The intermodal
project helps to integrate various modes of transportation, includ-
ing public roads, and further serves to provide breathing space to
Virginia's road network by removing trucks from the roads."0 The
decision also shows the deference the court will give to the Gen-
102. Id. (quoting H.J. Res. 789, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2005)).
103. Id. at 438, 719 S.E.2d at 301.
104. Id. at 439, 719 S.E.2d at 302.
105. Id. at 440 n.8, 719 S.E.2d at 302-03 n.8.
106. Id. at 441, 719 S.E.2d at 304 (citation omitted).
107. Id., 719 S.E.2d at 303-04 (quoting Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 790-91, 91 S.E.2d
660, 667 (1956)).
108. Id., 719, S.E.2d at 303.
109. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
110. See supra Part II.A.
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eral Assembly in determining how best to manage Virginia's pub-
lic roads.
The court's rejection of the credit clause challenge is unsurpris-
ing. A grant conditioned upon meeting certain performance
benchmarks does not constitute an extension of credit as that
term is commonly understood."1
Finally, although the court grounded its decision chiefly on its
own precedent, the outcome is defensible on originalism grounds.
The internal improvements clause and the credit clause were
added to the Virginia Constitution to prohibit the Commonwealth
from fostering private enterprises by capitalizing them through
loans, purchases of stocks and bonds, and any other means of ac-
quiring a financial "interest" in such projects."2 Although, on a
superficial level, the intermodal rail project involves taxpayer
money awarded to a private railroad, a grant of funds to a private
railroad, which is subject to specific performance benchmarks and
which is designed to accomplish a variety of public policy objec-
tives such as reducing pollution and congestion, does not in sub-
stance resemble the practices that gave rise to the internal im-
provement clause and credit clause.
IV. ONGOING RELEVANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
Under current practices for funding transportation infrastruc-
ture, it is true, as Professor Howard notes, that article X, section
10 does not impose "a significant barrier to legislative response to
modern problems.""' 3 The state no longer capitalizes infrastruc-
ture companies by extending loans, purchasing their stock, or
otherwise acquiring an "interest" in such companies as it did in
the nineteenth century.114 The sophistication of modern capital
markets obviates the need for the state to extend its funds for
such purposes.
It would be premature, however, to relegate these clauses to
utter irrelevance. Virginia faces a significant challenge in mod-
ernizing and expanding its infrastructure."' At the same time,
111. Montgomery Cnty., 282 Va. at 441, 719 S.E.2d at 303.
112. See supra notes 21-22.
113. HOWARD, supra note 11, at 1130.
114. See supra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
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the Commonwealth finds itself in the budgetary vise of funding
increasingly expensive entitlement programs-as well as its pen-
sion obligations for state employees-all while maintaining basic
services.116 In order to provide its infrastructure needs, Virginia
could well be tempted in the near future to once more capitalize
private enterprises, particularly if, for whatever reason, private
capital is unwilling or unable to supply the requisite funds. Pur-
chases of stock, extensions of credit, and other arrangements
would again be defended, as they were in the nineteenth century,
on the ground that they are low-risk or even a source of revenue
for the Commonwealth. Any such arrangement would be con-
strained to a significant degree by article X, section 10. The credit
clause and internal improvements clause also likely would limit
commonwealth funding for new transportation technologies, such
as space travel. Until the Commonwealth returns to the practices
that gave rise to the internal improvements clause and credit
clause, however, challenges to government action based on article
X, section 10 are unlikely to succeed.
Perhaps the overarching lesson of these clauses for our time is
that amassing large debts under favorable economic conditions,
with overly optimistic projections for future repayment, will lead
to financial hardship and political turmoil. Although that may
seem an obvious point, it repeatedly has been ignored throughout
history. That lesson is no less relevant today than it was in the
mid-nineteenth century.
116. See Michael Martz, Assembly Passes Pension Overhaul, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
March 11, 2012, at Al; Jim Nolan, Budget Changes Weighed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, May
14, 2012, at Al.
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